To reduce the signature verification time, Harn proposed an efficient batch verifying multiple DSA-type digital signatures instead of verifying each individual digital signature separately. However, there is a weakness in his scheme. In this article, we present our attack to against his scheme.
Introduction
In digital signature, a sender signed a document using his/her private key and a receiver can verify this signature by the sender's public key. When the sender signed t documents for the receiver, the sender need to generate t signatures and the receiver need to verify these signatures in t times. This is inefficient to verify those signatures for the receiver. In 1994, Naccache et al. [7] proposed an efficient scheme to batch verify multiple DSA digital signatures. The multiple DSA digital signatures are batch verified by the receiver which requires only one times. However, this scheme is insecure [6] . In 1995, Harn proposed a DSAtype secure interactive batch verification protocol [1] . In 1998, Harn proposed two types of efficient non-interactive batch verification protocol: DSA-type and RSA-type multiple digital signatures [2, 3] . However, the batch verifying multiple RSA-type digital signatures [3] is insecure [5] .
The batch verifying multiple DSA-type digital signatures [2] can against Lim and Lee's attack [6] . This scheme is based on the DSA-type digital signature [4] . The main advantage of this scheme is that it reduces signature verification time. It is more efficient than verify each individual signature separately. However, there is a weakness in his scheme. In this article, we will show that an attacker can easily forge individual signatures and make the batch verification valid.
Rieview
In this section, we review the Harn's DSA-type digital signature [4] and batch verifying multiple DSA-type digital signature [2] .
DSA-type Digital Signature:
The parameters of DSA-type digital signature are composed by public information p, q, g, a public key y and a secret key x, where p is a large prime, q is a factor of (p − 1), g is generated from GF(p), x is a random number less than q, and y is computed by y = g x mod p.
Assume that Alice wants to send message M and its digital signature (r, s)
to Bob. The sender, Alice, need to generate the digital signature (r, s) as follows. First, Alice generates a random number, k, less than q. Next, Alice computes r and s as follows.
Whenever Bob receives (M, r, s) from Alice, he verifies the correctness of the signature on the message M by checking whether the equation r = (g sr −1 y M r −1 mod p) mod q holds.
Multiple DSA-type Digital Signature:
Assume that Alice wants to send M 1 , M 2 , · · · , M t and its digital signatures (r 1 , s 1 ), (r 2 , s 2 ), · · · , (r t , s t ) to Bob. All digital signatures satisfy the following equation:
Whenever Bob receives these multiple signatures from Alice, Bob verifies the correctness of these multiple signatures on messages M 1 , M 2 , · · · , M t by checking the following equation: 
The Weakness of Harn's Scheme
In this section, we show that the signer, Alice, can forge individual signatures and make a false batch verification valid.
We assume that the signer, Alice, sends messages and its forged signatures to the receiver Bob. Let s i = s i + a i r i mod q, i = 1, 2, · · · , t, where a i is an integer such that For example, Alice forges three signatures (r 1 , s 1 ), (r 2 , s 2 ), (r 3 , s 3 ) of messages M 1 , M 2 , M 3 , respectively. Here, s 1 = s 1 +2r 1 mod q, s 2 = s 2 +3r 2 mod q, s 3 = s 3 − 5r 3 mod q, and 
Since the above equation holds, Bob believes that the signatures (r 1 , s 1 ), (r 2 , s 2 ), and (r 3 , s 3 ) are valid signatures of messages M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 , respectively. However, Alice can deny she had signed these messages to Bob, because
Although the DSA-type digital signature is a secure scheme to produce individual signature [4] , the batch verifying multiple DSA-type digital signatures [2] is insecure.
Conclusion
Harn proposed an efficient batch verifying multiple DSA-type digital signatures instead of verifying each individual digital signature separately. However, we presented a weakness of his scheme in this letter. We have shown that a signer can easily forge his/her signatures and the receiver cannot discover that the signatures are illegal in Harn's scheme.
